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CASE NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE AS APPLIED TO
SEGREGATION IN GRADUATE AND PROFESSIONAL SCHOOLS
Two cases decided by the United States Court involve the same principle. Because
of their proximity in time they are noted together.
Petitioner, a Negro, applied for admission to the University of Texas Law School.
He was rejected solely because he was a Negro. Such rejection was in accordance with
state law, which restricted students at the University to members of the white race.
Thereupon, petitioner brought mandamus to compel his admission, which was denied
by the state trial court on the ground that the law school for Negroes established by the
State offered petitioner "privileges, advantages and opportunities for the study of
law substantially equivalent to those offered by the State to white students at the University of Texas." On appeal, the State Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari, Held: Reversed. Rejection of applicants to
graduate and professional schools supported by the state solely because of race violates
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Equal protection of laws
includes the right of association with the future professional men and women of the
state. Sweatt v. Painter70 S.Ct. 848 (1950).
Petitioner, a Negro citizen of Oklahoma, was admitted to the University of Oklahoma
in order to pursue studies leading to a Doctorate of Education. Such admission was
upon a segregated basis, in accordance with the laws of the State of Oklahoma. After
admission of petitioner, he was required to sit in an assigned seat in the classroom
in a row specified for colored students, was assigned to a particular table in the library
and in the cafeteria, and otherwise segregated. This was in accordance with rules
promulgated by the university president, under statutory authorization. To remove
these conditions, petitioner filed his petition in the federal district court, claiming that
such treatment denied him equal protection of the laws under the Federal Constitution.
The district court held that such treatment did not violate the equal protection clause
of the Constitution. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Held: Reversed.
Colored students admitted to a state university to pursue graduate or professional
studies under rules providing for segregation of the races are entitled to the same
treatment at the hands of the state as students of other races, and any other treatment
violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education, 70 S.Ct. 851 (1950).
It is a well-established principle that a state has the authority, under its general
police power, to enact segregation laws. Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 48 S.Ct. 91,
72 L.Ed. 172 (1927); People ex rel. King v. .Gallagher,93 N.Y. 438, 45 Am. Rep. 232
(1883). In this respect, the state legislature is the sole judge as to what laws should
be passed for the welfare of its people, and as to when and how the police power is to
be exercised. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 8 S.Ct. 273, 31 L.Ed. 205 (1887) ; Lawton
v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 14 S.Ct. 499, 38 L.Ed. 385 (1893) ; In re Madera IrrigationDist.,
92 Cal. 296, 28 Pac. 272, 14 L.R.A. 755 (1891). The discretion of the state legislature
is very wide in determining what the interests of the public welfare require and what
means are reasonably necessary to effectuate those interests. Thurlow v. Massachusetts,
5 How. 504 (U.S. 1847); Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 8 S.Ct. 992, 32 L.Ed. 253
(1888). A determination by the legislature as to what is a proper exercise of the police
power is not final or conclusive, however, but is subject to the supervision of the courts.
Lawton v. Steele, supra. One of the basic principles involved in considering legislation
attacked under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the wide
range of discretion possessed by the state in enacting laws concerning matters within
its jurisdiction. When the subject matter is within the police power of the state, debatable questions as to its proper exercise are not for the courts but for the legislature,
which is entitled to form its own judgment. Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 52 S.Ct.
581, 76 L.Ed. 1167 (1931). Among the rules by which the equal protection contention
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may be tested are: (1) The equal protection clause does not deprive the state of the
power to classify in the enactment of its police legislation, since the state has a wide
discretion in this regard. State action denies equal protection of the law only when it
is arbitrary and has no reasonable foundation. (2) One who assails the validity of such
action must bear the burden of showing that it has no reasonable foundation, but is
essentially arbitrary. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 31 S.Ct. 337,
55 L.Ed. 369 (1911). State classification under the police power should be upheld if
there is a reasonable and practical ground for such classification, even though some
other classification would appear to some to be more in line with the general welfare.
Davis v. Florida Power Co., 64 Fla. 246, 60 So. 759 (1913) ; See Crescent Cotton Oil
Co. v. Mississippi, 257 U.S. 129, 42 S.Ct. 42, 66 L.Ed. 166 (1921). This is true, even
though the law results in some inequality in practice. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic
Gas Co., supra.
The primary purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to secure to the Negro race
equality of civil rights, but it was not the purpose of that amendment to abolish all
distinctions based on color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality,
or to compel a commingling of the two races on terms unsatisfactory to either. If one
race is inferior to another socially, the Constitution of the United States cannot put it
upon the same plane with other races living in the country. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256 (1896). It was not the purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment to force upon any one a social inferior, but to give to the newly emancipated Negro the full enjoyment of his freedom. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 47
S.Ct. 446, 71 L.Ed. 759 (1927) ; Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 38 S.Ct. 16, 62 L.Ed.
149 (1917). If the different races are to meet upon terms of social equality, it must
be the result of natural affinities and mutual appreciation of each other's merits, and
not by legislation or judicial decree. Such attempts to eradicate distinctions based upon
physical differences and the desires and prejudices of individuals will only result in
accentuating the already difficult situation. See Plessy v. Ferguson, supra. Where the
question is involved, the courts seem to consider it not so much as a problem of segregation but one of equality of treatment, and the emphasis is being placed more and
more upon equality. See McCabe v. Atchison, T. and S. F. Ry. Co., 235 U.S. 151, 35.
S.Ct. 69, 59 L.Ed. 169 (1914) ; Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 59 S.Ct.
232, 83 L.Ed. 208 (1938).
In the instant cases, the question before the court was whether segregation statutes,
as applied to graduate or professional students, amount to a denial of equal protection
of the law. In both cases the Court was careful to point out that its decisions were
limited to the particular facts before it, and did not intimate as to what its holding
would be had the facts been different. Previously, the Court had decided that equal
protection was violated by requiring a member of the Negro race, who had applied for
admission to a state law school, to attend a law school in another state, even though
the other school might be as good or better than the law school located within the state.
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, supra. It did not hold, however, as did one of the
instant cases (the Sweatt case), that it was impossible to provide for an equal law
school as long as the students were segregated. It seems that segregation itself would
amount to inequality in graduate and professional schools supported by the state. And
it is highly probable that this principle could very easily apply to state colleges below
the graduate or professional level. It seems very unlikely, however, that it would apply
to public school systems below college level, provided the states make a bona fide effort to
equalize educational opportunities for all races. The wide discretion formerly exercised by the states in the exercise of their police power apparently is narrowly restricted by these decisions, at least as far as segregation statutes are concerned.
J.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FEDERAL JURISDICTION IN CASES INVOLVING
APPORTIONMENT OF ELECTORAL POWER-GEORGIA
COUNTY UNIT SYSTEM-I*
Appellants, voters of Fulton County, Georgia, alleged that Georgia's county unit
system, GA. CODE § 34-3212 et seq. (1933), violates the Fourteenth and Seventeenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. Under this system of holding primary
elections each county is awarded two unit votes for each representative that the particular county is entitled to in the lower house of the General Assembly. The unit votes
for the counties range from six in the most populous to two in the less populous ones.
The candidate receiving the highest popular vote in a county is awarded that county's
total number of unit votes. Appellants contended that their votes in Fulton County
have on the average only one-tenth the weight of votes cast in other counties, and that
such a discrepancy in the value of votes amounts to an unconstitutional discrimination
against them. Thus, appellants brought suit to restrain adherence to the statute in the
forthcoming primary for U. S. Senator, Governor and other state officers. A three judge
district court dismissed the petition, one judge dissenting. On appeal, Held: Affirmed,
two justices dissenting. Federal courts consistently refuse to exercise equity powers in
cases posing political issues arising from a state's geographical distribution of electoral
strength among its political subdivisions. South v. Peters, 70 S.Ct. 641 (1950).
The refusal of federal courts to exercise their equity powers in cases of this type
can be traced to Article I, Section 4 of the United States Constitution, which expressly
gives the states power to regulate elections themselves with only the power of alteration
reserved to Congress. Furthermore, the states confer the privilege of voting except, of
course, as regulated by the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments and certain other
provisions of the Federal Constitution. With this power of regulating elections residing
in the states, Georgia has engrafted the county unit system in some form into its electoral scheme since the first State Constitution in 1777, South v. Peters, supra, n. 642,
the latest statute being Ga. Laws 1917, p. 183, GA. CODE §§ 34-3212 et seq. (1933) (Neill
Primary Act). The courts will not strike down apportionment statutes of the states,
notwithstanding glaring inequalities, because of the fact that Congress did not stipulate
in the Reapportionment Act of 1929, as amended, 1 U.S.C.A. § 2, cl. 3 (Supp. 1949),
that equality of population is mandatory. Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1, 53 S.Ct. 77 L.Ed.
131 (1932). No major constitutional questions were decided in the Wood case, supra, the
Court merely saying that the then existing apportionment act made no provision for
equality of population. However, the Court, in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 66 S.Ct.
1198, 90 L.Ed. 1432 (1946), when faced with a similar situation held flatly that such
a situation was one of a peculiarly political nature and therefore not meet for judicial
determination. Thus, the long-recognized "legal loophole" of political question was
utilized to deny relief. This doctrine was recognized as early as 1849 in the case of
Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1 (U.S. 1849), and from recent decisions it is apparently
deeply rooted in our jurisprudence. As one writer so aptly put it, the important factor
in the formulation of the doctrine is the lack of legal principles to apply to the question
presented. 8 MINN. L. REV. 485 (1924). Thus, in the recent cases of Cook v. Fortson,
68 F. Supp. 624 (N.D. Ga. 1946), Turman v. Duckworth, 68 F. Supp. 744 (N.D. Ga.
1946), and South v. Peters,supra, wherein the county unit system was directly attacked
in each case, the courts held that the doctrine of Colegrove v. Green, supra, was controlling and consequently denied relief, relying on the political question doctrine.
The vigorous dissents in the recent Colegrove and South cases, supra, tend to raise
the question of whether the inequalities mentioned are actually political questions over
which the eourts have no power to act. The county unit problem is essentially a voter
disfranchisement question, and as such is not a "political question." 2 MERCER L. REV.
*See casenote immediately following.
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19 (1950). It is sometimes said that a political question is one in regard to which the
legislative and executive branches have full discretionary authority. Geauga Lake Improvement Ass'n. v. Lozier, 125 Ohio St. 565, 182 N.E. 489 (1932). But it certainly
seems that the judicial branch of our government would have the power to rectify an
abuse of this discretionary authority. Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution, designating the jurisdiction of federal courts, extends such jurisdiction to
all cases in law and equity arising under the Constitution without making in its terms
any exception whatsoever. Pacific States Telegraph and Telegram Co. v. Oregon, 223
U.S. 118, 32 S.Ct. 224, 56 L.Ed. 377 (1912). However, the federal courts, in exercising
this jurisdiction, tread lightly into fields that border on "political questions." The
Court in MacDougal v. Green, 335 U.S. 281, 69 S.Ct. 1, 93 L.Ed. 3 (1948), placed particular emphasis on the probable consequences and effect of an injunction if granted.
Mr. Justice Rutledge in a separate concurring opinion said that relief could only be
had at the gravest risk of disrupting the election process. Thus, the exigencies of the
situation itself dealt heavily in the preclusion of relief. In Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S.
475, 23 S.Ct. 639, 47 L.Ed. 909 (1903), the Court evidently recognized this aspect of
political cases and intimated that the protection of individual political rights was within the legitimate exercise of equitable powers where the consequences of a decree would
not present practical difficulties in its enforcement. A political party is an agency of
the state in so far as it determines the participants in a primary, and federal courts
wil protect abridgement of voting rights in the primary. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S.
649, 64 S.Ct. 757, 88 L.Ed. 987 (1944) ; accord, United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299,
61 S.Ct. 1031, 85 L.Ed. 1368 (1941). Thus, a state cannot deny eligible voters the right
to vote for Congressmen nor the right to have that vote counted, and it can no more
destroy the effectiveness of their vote in part and no more accomplish this in the name
of apportionment than under any other name. See Mr. Justice Black's dissent in Colgrove v. Green, supra. Apparently, the majority of the court in the instant case overlooked the gross inequality and the invidious discrimination of the Georgia situation,
and looked to and resorted to the omnious outlet of the "political question" in rendering
its decision. Whereas the dissenters, cognizant of the gravity of the issue, ably and
logically endeavored to show the unconstitutionality of the county unit statute.
JOSEPH H. DAVIS.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FEDERAL JURISDICTION IN CASES INVOLVING
APPORTIONMENT OF ELECTORAL POWER-GEORGIA
COUNTYf UNIT SYSTEM-II*
Plaintiffs, residents of Georgia's most populous county, sued Georgia State Democratic Committee to restrain adherence to the Georgia statute providing that candidates receiving a plurality of votes cast in each county will be awarded that county's
total of unit votes. A majority of such unit votes determines the outcome of a primary
election. GA. CODE §§ 2-1601, 34-3212 et seq. (1933). The statute was attacked as being
violative of the Fourteenth and Seventeenth Amendments in that the system results in
plaintiffs' votes carrying, on the average, but one-tenth the weight of those of voters
in the other counties. The District Court for the Northern District of Georgia dismissed
the petition. On appeal, Held: Affirmed. Federal courts will not exercise their equity
powers in cases posing political issues arising from a state's geographical distribution
of electoral strength among its political subdivisions. South v. Peters, 70 S.Ct. 641
(1950).
Though it has been held that courts of law and equity are absolutely without jurisdiction over "political questions," State of Georgia v. Stanton, 6 Wall. 50 (U.S. 1867),
the general rule is that the judicial department of the government has no right to
interfere with or attempt to control the exercise of political rights, unless jurisdiction
*See casenote immediately preceding.
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is conferred by constitutional or statutory provision. People v. McWeeney, 259 Ill. 161,
102 N.E. 233, Ann. Cas. 1916B 34 (1913). Except when jurisdiction is so conferred, all
matters relating to or affecting elections are political questions and not questions for
the judiciary. Printup v. Adkins, 150 Ga. 347, 103 S.E. 843 (1920) ; 16 C.J.S. 438. Such
controversies are by law for the determination of the executive or legislative departments, or of the people themselves. Assets Realization Corporation v. Hull, 114 F.2d
464 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
Apportioning voting power is a specific legislative duty, Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S.
355, 52 S.Ct. 397, 76 L.Ed. 795 (1932), for which the legislature is responsible to the
people alone. Fergus v. Marks, 321 Ill. 510, 152 N.E. 557, 46 A.L.R. 960 (1926). If the
legislature, in its discretion, passes an apportionment law which is within bounds fixed
by State and Federal Constitution it is valid, though it may result in inequality and
injustice. People v. Thompson, 155 Ill. 451, 40 N.E. 307 (1895). And this is true regardless of the motive of the legislature in making the apportionment. People v. Thompson, supra; In Re Livingston, 96 Misc. 341, 160 N.Y. Supp. 462 (1916). But, an apportionment act that is manifestly contrary to State or Federal Constitution, or statutes,
will be declared invalid. Donovan v. Suffolk County Apportionment Commissioners, 225
Mass. 55, 113 N.E. 740, 2 A.L.R. 1334 (1916).
The Supreme Court has modified the general rule by laying down the "policy doctrine,"
to-wit: The Supreme Court has power to afford relief in cases of apportioning laws as
against the objection that the issues are not justiciable, but will refuse to exercise that
power in such rases as a matter of policy. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 66 S.Ct.
1198, 90 L.Ed. 1432 (1946). This rule was further modified, or contradicted, by a holding that it is allowable state policy to require that candidates for state-wide office have
support not limited to a concentrated locality, and by declaring that such requirement
is not denial of equal protection of laws. MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281, 69 S.Ct.
1, 93 L.Ed. 3 (1948).
The instant case seems to fall in the category of superfluous litigation, for its result
would have been the same, in light of existing authorities, irrespective of what line of
reasoning the Supreme Court chose to follow: (1) The case falls within the general
rule, as the Georgia statute is within bounds fixed by State and Federal Constitution
and statutes. U. S. CONST. Art. I, §§ 2, 4, 5; 2 U.S.C. §§ 2a, 3 (1946) ; (2) It is within
the "policy doctrine." Colgrove v. Green, supra; (3) Such an apportionment is not
unconstitutional as a deprivation of equal protection of laws. MacDougall v. Green,
supra; Turman v. Duckworth, 68 F. Supp. 744 (N.D. Ga. 1946) ; (4) And, two recent
federal decisions have upheld the County Unit System. Turman v. Duckworth, supra;
Cook v. Fortson, 68 F. Supp. 624 (N.D. Ga. 1946). That the Supreme Court regarded
the case as superfluous seems evident from their almost summary disposition of it.
BURT DERIEUX.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TREATIES--CONFLICT

BETWEEN UNITED

NATIONS CHARTER AND STATE LAW
Plaintiff, a Japanese alien ineligible for citizenship under the laws of the United
States, brought suit against the State of California to determine whether land held by
him under deed had escheated to defendant pursuant to the Alien Land Law of the state.
The statute in question prohibited ownership of real property by persons not eligible
for citizenship under the federal naturalization laws, and provided for an escheat from
the date of acquisition of land by persons of this class. The United Nations Charter,
Chapter 9, Article 55, provides: "The United Nations shall promote universal respect
for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedom for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." The trial court held that an escheat had
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occurred. On appeal, Held: Reversed. The California Alien Land Law is suspended as
a discrimination based on race and color in violation of the United Nations Charter,
a treaty entered into by the United States. Sei Fujii v. State, 217 P.2d 481 (Cal. 1950).
A treaty entered into by the United States is made the supreme law of the land by
constitutional mandate. U. S. CONST. Art. VI; See Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332,
44 S.Ct. 515, 68 L.Ed. 1041 (1923) and Minnesota Canal & Power Co. v. Pratt, 101
Minn. 197, 112 N.W. 395 (1907).
Where a court is called upon to interpret a treaty in pari nateria with a state statute
the court is bound, whenever reasonably possible, to give the language of the treaty
a meaning so as not to set aside the state law, or to encroach upon rights arising under
it, or to remove disabilities created by it. Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304
U.S. 126, 58 S.Ct. 785, 82 L.Ed. 1224 (1937) ; Todok v. Union State Bank, 281 U.S. 449,
50 S.Ct. 363, 74 L.Ed. 956 (1929) ; Wyers v. Arnold, 347 Mo. 413, 147 S.W.2d 644 (1941).
Except where a clear necessity appears to give judicial force to the expressed national
policy, a treaty will be construed with microscopic scrutiny in order not to chisel away
the jurisdiction and authority of the state over the subject matter. United States v.
Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 62 S.Ct. 552, 86 L.Ed. 796 (1941). In matters inherently local, a
recognized presumption arises against any intention on the part of the federal government to invade by treaty the right of a state to regulate her own affairs. In re Servas'
Estate, 169 Cal. 240, 146 Pac. 651 (1915) ; In re Ghio's Estate, 157 Cal. 552, 108 Pac.
516 (1910), aff'd, 223 U.S. 317 (1911). At common law real property could not be
owned by an alien, and the right to withhold or grant the privilege of land ownership
to aliens has always been within the province of the state. Attorney General of California v. O'Brien and Inouye, 263 U.S. 313, 44 S.Ct. 112, 68 L.Ed. 318 (1923). From
the decisions of the United States Supreme Court it may be deducted that a treaty will,
if possible, be given a restricted construction where a broader construction would infringe upon a special power of the state over the subject matter; and the federal treatymaking power does not extend to the making of treaties which change the Constitution,
or which are inconsistent without form of government in the relation of the states with
the United States, Holden v. Joy, 17 Wall. 211 (U.S. 1872) ; The Cherokee Tobacco,
11 Wall. 616 (U.S. 1870). Under the constitutional dual system of government in the
United States, it falls clearly within the jurisdiction of the several states to regulate
the ownership of real property by aliens. Attorney General of California v. O'Brien and
Inouye, supra.
For a state law imposing disabilities on aliens to be suspended by a treaty, the
treaty must be an agreement between the United States and the country of which the
disabled alien is a citizen or subject. Wunderle v. Wunderle, 144 Ill. 40, 33 N.E. 195
(1893). Otherwise there cannot be a conflict between the treaty and the state law in
its application to the particular alien. Ahrens v. Ahrens, 144 Iowa 486, 123 N.W. 164
(1909).
In the instant case the California court apparently overlooked the presumption against
any intention on the part of the federal government to deprive a state of jurisdiction
over matters inherently local, such as the regulation of alien property rights. That the
vague language of the United Nations Charter warranted the interpretation placed
upon it is extremely doubtful. At the time the United Nations Charter was entered
into by the United States we were at war with Japan, plaintiff's sovereign. Technically,
war between the two countries still persists. Japan has not become a signatory of the
charter, and, therefore, plaintiff has no right to claim under it. By a simple application
of the law relevant to the issues presented to the court, the California Alien Land
Law would have been upheld.
PETER Z. GEER, JR.
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CRIMINAL LAW-ROBBERY-CONVICTION
"KIDNAPPING

SUSTAINED UNDER

STATUTE"

Appellant committed a single indivisible act and was convicted of both armed robbery
and kidnapping for the purpose of robbery. The "kidnapping statute" provides, in substance, that one who holds or detains another to commit extortion or robbery, where the
victim suffers bodily harm, shall be punished by death or life imprisonment without
possibility of parole. CAL. PENAL CODE § 209 (1949). An appeal was brought, appellant
contending that the kidnapping statute applies only to orthodox kidnapping for ransom
or robbery and not to the detention of the victim during the commission of armed robbery. Held: Judgment reversed as to the conviction for armed robbery; affirmed as to
the conviction for kidnapping for the purpose of robbery. If statutory words are clear,
the court should not add to or alter them to accomplish a purpose that does not appear
on the face of the statute or from its legislative history. People v. Chessman, 217 P.2d
1 (Cal. 1950).
A statute is the written will of the legislature, and the ultimate concern of the courts
in construing a statute is a determination of the scope the legislature intended that it
be given. Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U.S. 79, 60 S.Ct. 34, 84 L.Ed. 93 (1939);
Washington v. Dowling, 92 Fla. 601, 109 So. 588 (1926). The legislative intent is the
controlling factor and there is no invariable rule for its discovery. United States v.
American Trucking Ass'n., 310 U.S. 534, 60 S.Ct. 1059, 84 L.Ed. 1345 (1940). It is
first to be sought from the words employed, and if the language is unambiguous, the
words plain and clear, conveying a distinct idea, there is no occasion for the courts to
resort to other means of interpretation. Matson Nay. Co. v. United States, 284 U.S.
352, 52 S.Ct. 162, 76 L.Ed. 336 (1932) ; In re Miller, 31 Cal.2d 191, 187 P.2d 722 (1947) ;
Town of Putnam Valley v. Slutzky, 283 N.Y. 334, 28 N.E.2d 860 (1940). However, if
such literal interpretation of the words of a statute would destroy or modify the intention of the legislature, it must yield to the evident spirit and purpose of the statute
when this is necessary to effect that intention. S. E. C. v. Joiner Leasing Corporation,
320 U.S. 344, 64 S.Ct. 120, 88 L.Ed. 88 (1943) ; People v. Reilly, 280 N.Y. 509, 19
N.E.2d. 919 (1939).
To aid further in the ascertainment of the meaning of a statute, the courts rely on
both intrinsic and extrinsic sources. These include the legislative history of the
particular statute, the historical background of the subject, the evil designed to be
remedied, the equity of the statute, the practical socio-economic effect of the interpretation and other considerations. N. L. R. B. v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 64
S.Ct. 851, 88 L.Ed. 1170 (1944) ; Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 1375,
92 L.Ed. 1787 (1948) ; Switchmens Union v. National Mediation Board, 320 U.S. 297,
64 S.Ct. 95, 88 L.Ed. 61 (1943). Also see EHRLISH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE
SOCIOLOGY OF LAW cc. 2,3,4 (1913). Resort is also had to the canons of statutory construction as an aid in interpretation. Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303, 58 S.Ct. 559, 82
L.Ed. 858 (1938) ; S.E.C. v. Joiner Leasing Corporation, supra. The courts proceed
on the theory that the legislature is deemed to know the settled maxims and principles
of statutory interpretation and that these will be applied to a statute. State v. Bell,
184 N.C. 701, 115 S.E. 190 (1922). The purpose of all the rules of statutory construction is to ascertain the legislative intent. Benson v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry. Co.,
75 Minn. 163, 77 N.W. 798 (1899). Generally, courts give criminal and penal statutes
a stricter and narrower interpretation than that given to remedial statutes. This does
not mean that a narrow technical meaning will be given to words in disregard of their
context and so far as to frustrate the legislative intent. United States v. Giles, 300 U.S.
41, 57 S.Ct. 340, 81 L.Ed. 493 (1937) ; United States v. Corbett, 215 U.S. 233, 30 St.Ct.
81, 54 L.Ed. 173 (1909).
In the instant case the court used a literal approach and the "plain meaning" rule in
their interpretation of a penal statute. A thing may be within the letter of a statute
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and yet not within its spirit or purpose. Surely, the purpose of a statute is a good guide
for discovering reasonable limits for literal expressions. "Few words are so plain that
the context or the occasion is without capacity to enlarge or narrow their extension.
The thought behind the phrase proclaims itself misread when the outcome of the reading is injustice or absurdity." Cardoza, J. in Surace v. Danna, 248 N.Y. 18, 161 N.E.
315 (1928). The juristic task consists of gathering from extrinsic as well as intrinsic
materials, such as the social phenomena and the whole setting of a statute, the purpose,
economic, social or moral, which the statute is supposed to contain. The purpose of a
statute is certainly an excellent guide for the discovery of the legislative intent. Nonetheless, the majority in the instant case deemed it unnecessary to go further than the
literal import of the words themselves to discover that intent. Their interpretation leads
neither to injustice, oppression nor absurdity in such a degree as would violate the
prevalent conception of the fundamental principles of justice.
DAVID

R.

ROGERS.

CRIMINAL LAW-VALIDITY OF FOREIGN PRIOR FELONY CONVICTION
UNDER SECOND-OFFENDER4FELONY STATUTE
Defendant was convicted in New York as a second-felony-offender, as the result of a
prior conviction in New Jersey of a crime which made any theft of twenty dollars or
more a felony. N. J. STAT. ANN. § 2:145-2. Defendant had pleaded guilty to an indictment accusing him of taking two hundred dollars and a gold watch, "all to the value
of over twenty dollars." The second-offender-felony conviction was based in the New
York trial upon a statute which provides that a defendant convicted of a felony in New
York will be punished as a second-felony-offender if he has been previously "convicted
... under the laws of any state . . . of a crime which, if committed within this state
would be a felony." N. Y. PENAL LAW §§ 1941, 1942 (McKinney, 1944). Defendant contended that since the New York felony statute requires taking goods over one hundred
dollars in value, he could not be convicted under the second offender statute since he
had actually pleaded guilty to the indictment charging the taking of goods of a value
only over twenty dollars, the minimum in New Jersey for creating a felony, although
he simultaneously admitted the larger sum. New York requires the taking to be in
excess of one hundred dollars. Hence the defendant pleaded that his conviction in New
Jersey was not subject to the second-offender-felony statute. On appeal, Held: Reversed. Defendant was entitled to acquittal since his guilty plea was to a "sum in
excess of twenty dollars," and the recital of goods actually taken was in reality mere
surplusage in the indictment. People v. Olah, 300 N.Y. 96, 89 N.E.2d 329 (1949).
New York courts have repeatedly held that Section 1942 of the Penal Law was
adopted by the legislature for the purpose of providing greater punishment for one
who is persistent in the commission of crime. People v. LeSasso, 182 Misc. 538, 44
N.Y.S.2d 93 (1943); People v. Wicklem, 183 Misc. 639, 53 N.Y.S.2d 88, 5 A.L.R.2d
110 (1944). Also, by the express provision of the statute a person who has been previously convicted "under the law of any state" is liable for additional punishment. The
legislature intended this to be applied only if the conviction in the foreign state was a
legal conviction in that state. People v. Wicklem, supra. With this as the avowed general purpose of the statute, it is interesting to note that the case of Newman v. Foster,
297 N.Y. 27, 74 N.E.2d 224 (1947), was heavily relied upon to reach the decision in
the principal case. In the Newman case the information to which relator pleaded guilty
in the New Jersey court alleged only the carrying of a concealed revolver; indeed, any
further recital would have been surplasage. In an earlier case it was held that, in a
proceeding under an information charging defendant with a previous conviction of
larceny in Massachusetts, the test was whether defendant was convicted of a crime
which, if committed in New York, would be a felony. People v. Dacey 166 Misc. 827,
3 N.Y.S.2d 156 (1938). See also 5 A.L.R.2d 1090, 1103, 1111 (1949).
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It has been held necessary to allege and prove that the offense for which defendant
has been perviously convicted in another state was a felony in that state. Allen v. Comrnonvwealth, 272 Ky. 533, 114 S.W.2d 757 (1938). Under similar second-offender-felony
statutes, it has been held sufficient to prove that the foreign conviction was one which
might have been punished with death or imprisonment in the jurisdiction where the
conviction was had. Kelley v. State, 204 Ind. 612, 185 N.E. 453 (1933) ; State v. Brown,
185 La. 855, 171 So. 55 (1936). A defendant's prior conviction of a felony in Pennsylvania was held insufficient in California to class defendant as an habitual criminal
since the act that was committed in Pennsylvania would have only been a misdemeanor
in California. People v. Pace, 2 Cal. App.2d 464, 38 P.2d 202 (1934) ; In re Thompson,
72 Cal. App.2d 747, 165 P.2d 533 (1946). The prior conviction for theft of tobacco in
North Carolina, value of only one hundred dollars, would not have been grand larceny
if committed in California and therefore cannot be used to adjudge one an habitual
criminal. Taylor v. Adam, 64 Cal. App.2d 47, 148 P.2d 143 (1944); In re Thompson,
8upra; Ex parte Williams, 76 Ca. App.2d 161, 172 P.2d 558 (1946).
However, authorities are not in agreement as to whether a former conviction in one
state will preclude its use for the purpose of enhancing the penalty for a subsequent
offense in another state. 5 A.L.R.2d 1109 (1949). Whether previous convictions of a
felony were had within or without the state, the felon is punished as a persistent
violator of the law, and the fact that such offenses would not have been felonies if
committed in the state is immaterial. State v. Prince, 64 Idaho 343, 132 P.2d 146 (1942).
Georgia, however, has decreed in accord with the general authorities that the entire
problem is an exclusive creature of statute; and in the absence of a specific statute
authorizing a foreign conviction to be used in connection with the present prosecution,
the only prior convictions which may be used with the second-offender-felony statute
are those occurring within its own jurisdiction. Lowe v. State, 50 Ga. App. 369, 178
S.E. 203 (1935).
The court in the principal case has interpreted the statute with extreme liberality
as applied to the facts. To allow defendant to plead guilty to an earlier indictment,
including allegations that would constitute a felony both in New Jersey and New York
and then hold that since the only requirement for the earlier felony was a taking in
excess of twenty dollars, not the confessed in excess of two hundred dollars, is to misconstrue the true nature of the indictment. "To the excess of twenty dollars" is the
true surplusage-being merely a brief manner of defining a felony in New Jersey.
Since this situation is novel, it seems that the New York court could have entered into
the spirit of the law, and yet remained within the letter of it. It cannot be doubted that
the intent of the legislature was to punish the habitual offender whether that offense
occurred within the limits of New York or elsewhere. Likewise, it appears that this
intent could be best served by allowing the conviction to stand.
JOHN M. ROBBINS.

EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY OF TESTIMONY REFERRING
TO, LIABILITY INSURANCE
Plaintiff suffered personal injuries when struck by defendant's automobile. In redirect testimony defendant made an inferential denial of having stated to plaintiff's
father that "He would take care of all damages" by testifying that the only reference
made by him in conversation with the father was to mention two insurance policies
which he thought would take care of the expenses. Admitting the policies in evidence
over plaintiff's objection, the court instructed the jury that the policies covered nothing
sued for here. Judgment for defendant. Held: Reversed. Defendant's testimony, although purporting to deny statement attributed to him by plaintiff's father, unnecessarily injected the question of insurance before the jury. Wilbur v. Tourangeau, 71
A.2d 565 (Vt. 1950).
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The test of relevancy and materiality in deciding questions of admissibility of evidence is held to be especially applicable with reference to the fact that defendant is
insured against liability for negligence. This general rule, though subject to qualifications not uniformly applied nor classified with exactitude, is universally recognized because "The tendency and effect are to withdraw the real defendant from the consideration of the jury, and substitute for him an insurance company." 56 A.L.R. 1422 (1928) ;
Brown v. Walter, 62 F.2d 798 (2d Cir. 1933) ; Akin v. Lee, 206 N.Y. 20, 99 N.E. 85
(1912) ; Gore v. Brockman, 138 Mo. App. 231, 119 S.W. 1082 (1909). But see Miller v.
Central Taxi Co., 110 Neb. 306, 193 N.W. 919 (1923), followed by Jessup v. Davis, 115
Neb. 1, 211 N.W. 190, 56 A.L.R. 1403 (1926). In the latter case the court justifies a
departure from the rule, particularly where the terms and character of the insurance
agreement give the insurer the right to defend, settle or otherwise control the controversy. This makes the insurer unquestionably the real party in interest, yet conceals
its identity from the jurors. Although the Miller case was subsequently overruled (Fieldivg v. Publix Cars, Inc., 130 Neb. 576, 265 N.W. 726 (1936)), most courts have allowed
the inclusion of evidence of insurance where such fact bears upon an issue in the case
and the introduction of such fact is made in good faith. Mullanix v. Basich, 67 Cal. App.
2d 675, 155 P.2d 130 (1945) (involving relationship of master and servant, the evidence
that the master carried liability insurance being admissible) ; Sibley v. Nason, 196 Mass.
125, 81 N.E. 887, 12 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1173, 124 Am. St. Rep. 520 (1907).
The two most widely recognized exceptions to the general rule of exclusion, however,
are of such character that they do not admit of certain application in all cases, but
must depend upon the sound discretion of the trial court. The first concerns the voir
dire examination of jurors. It is generally competent for plaintiff to ask whether any
of the jurors is interested in a liability insurance company as an employee, shareholder,
etc. Campbell v. Osterland, 283 Mich. 175, 277 N.W. 875 (1938) (improper to refuse
to allow examination of jurors). See 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 282a, n.1 (3d ed. 1940).
The sound discretion of the court is brought into play where such questioning of jurors
is not made in good faith but is resorted to as an indirect means to implant in the minds
of the jurors the existence of liability insurance in the case. Morrow v. Hume, 13 Ohio
St. 319, 3 N.E.2d 39 (1936). The Georgia holdings are in accord: Cone v. Davis, 66 Ga.
App. 229, 17 S.E.2d 849 (1941) ; Atlanta Coach Co. v. Cobb, 178 Ga. 544, 174 S.E. 131
(1934) ; Bibb Mfg. Co. v. Williams, 36 Ga. App. 605, 137 S.E. 636 (1927). The second
of the most widely recognized exceptions is the right of the plaintiff to question witnesses regarding their interest, if any, in a liability insurance company, it being reasoned that such fact, if established, tends to show bias or may have a bearing on the
credibility of witnesses and should be made known to the jury. Beatrice Creamery Co.
v. Goldman, 175 Okla. 300, 52 P.2d 1033 (1935) ; Moy Quon v. Furuya Co., 81 Wash.
526, 143 Pac. 99 (1914) ; Lenahan v. Pittston Coal Mining Co., 221 Pa. 626, 70 Atl. 884
(1908). In the Lenahan case defendant called its attorney as a wtness to discredit
another witness' testimony. His testimony that he was defendant's attorney was held
to be only a partial disclosure of his interest in the case, and plaintiff was allowed to
elicit the fact that he was also attorney for a liability insurance company which insured
defendant.
The discretion of the trial court may be applied in any of several ways in deciding
the consequences of improper injection of objectionable evidence; the alternatives ranging from an instruction to the jury to disregard the evidence to the extreme one of
declaring a mistrial. The controlling consideration must, it seems, be to what extent
has the wrongful introduction of the evidence influenced the jury. Mistrials or reversals
have been granted where evidence, though slight, has been wilfully or by artifice introduced without justification and with the obvious intent of getting the fact of insurance
before the jury. Frahm v. Siegal-Cooper, 131 App. Div. 747, 116 N.Y. Supp. 90 (1909) ;
Ryan v. Barrett, 105 Vt. 21, 162 Atl. 793 (1932). In many cases the damaging effect of
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objectionable evidence is not lessened when allowed to stand on the ground that it was
introduced indirectly but in good faith. That type of situation is probably the most
difficult to reconcile from the viewpoint of substantive rights as affected by procedural
rulings.
It is to be noted that the fact of no insurance (as in the principal case) is considered
no less prejudicial to plaintiff than the existence of liability insurance may be to defendant. Piechuck v. Magusia, 82 N.H. 429, 135 Atl. 534 (1926) ("The evidence is a
form of the inadmissible plea of poverty."); Avent v. Tucker, 188 Miss. 207, 194 So.
596 (1940) ; Malone v. Small, 291 S.W. 163 (Mo. App. 1927) (joint defendant not allowed to tell jury that questions addressed to jurors regarding their connection with an
insurance company did not apply to him). That artifice was employed in the principal
case seems nQt to have been doubted by the Vermont court in its reversal of the trial
court's judgment. A direct denial of what defendant was alleged to have said would
have accomplished the purported purpose of defendant's testimony, thus obviating any
reference to insurance. It is apparent from a study of the cases considered that the
test of relevancy and materiality in this branch of the law of evidence is not a complete
test. It remains for the judges to weigh other factors, the net effect of which in some
cases may be to disregard the primary rule.
GEORGE E. SALIBA.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-RELATION
BY GOVERNING

OF MAYOR TO ELECTIONS
BODY

Relator brought quo warranto to oust respondent from office of town clerk. In an
election by city council, which gave three votes for the relator and two for the respondent, the mayor claimed the right to vote and did vote to create a tie, and then voted
again to break the tie in favor of respondent. The town charter provided that the clerk
be elected by mayor and council. An ordinance relied on by respondent purportedly
authorized the mayor to "vote in all elections for officers; and give the deciding vote
upon all questions in case of a tie . . . . " Judgment by trial court for relator. Held:
Affirmed. The charter provision did not constitute the mayor a member of council, the
reference being merely to the name and style of the corporate governing body. Reliance by respondent on the ordinance was unavailing since the office of mayor, being
separate and distinct from that of councilman, rendered the ordinance ineffective.
Palmer v. Claxton, 59 S.E.2d 379, 206 Ga. 860 (1950).
The mayor of a municipality functions primarily as an administrative officer. Where
he is empowered to preside over meetings of a board of aldermen he does not, in absence of express statutory or charter provision, thereby become a member of council.
This is true even though he may have a casting vote in case of tie. Where he is by law
made a member of council he may vote to create a tie then vote again to break it.
Brown v. Foster,88 Me. 49, 33 Atl. 662, 31 L.R.A. 116 (1895) ; 2 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS § 620 (2d ed. 1928). The mayor's dual status-being only a presiding
officer but entitled to vote in case of tie--has produced some interesting questions.
Where he has only a casting vote, may he nevertheless be counted in determining whether the votes cast were a majority of the whole body? Decided in the affirmative: State
ex rel. Jebens v'. Noth, 173 Iowa 1, 151 N.W. 822 (1915) ; State ex rel. Hawkins v. Cook,
62 N.J.L. 84, 40 Atl. 781 (1898). In the Cook case three of five councilmen voted to
confirm, two voted against, an appointment to the office of fire marhsall. Although
entitled to vote only in case of a tie, the mayor was counted as a member of council,
thus requiring four votes to constitute a majority. The perplexing result was that there
was neither a majority nor a tie. If this ruling had obtained in the principal case, a
similar deadlock would have been created. Contra: Freint v. Borough of Dumont, 108
N.J.L. 245, 157 Atl. 382 (1931), which accords with the Georgia rulings to the effect
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that the mayor, when entitled to vote only in case of a tie, is not counted in computing
a majority of council. Gostin v. Brooks, 89 Ga. 244, 15 S.E. 361 (1892); Johnson v.
Arnold, 176 Ga. 910, 169 S.E. 505 (1933).
When does a tie exist so as to entitle a presiding mayor to a casting vote? It has
been held that where four of eight votes of councilmen were cast for one of three
candidates, the remaining four being equally divided between the other two (a majority being necessary to elect), the mayor was not entitled to vote. Such right to vote
was considered applicable only in those instances in which it could alter the final result
according to whether it is cast for one side or another, but not where it could create a
majority on one side only. State ex rel. Nelson v. Mott, 111 Wis. 19, 86 N.W. 569 (1901).
In State ex rel. Willman v. Edwards, 114 Ind. 581, 16 N.E. 627 (1888), the court held
that there was no tie when two votes were cast for one of two candidates, the other
two ballots being blank. (Edwards case overruled on another point by State ex rel.
Morris v. McFarland, 149 Ind. 266, 49 N.E. 5 (1898)). Contra: Launtz v. People, 113
Il1. 137, 55 Am. Rep. 405 (1885) (to deny right to vote in such situation is equivalent to
giving more potency to blank ballots than to positive votes cast for the opposing candidate). In Cole v. Chapman, 44 Conn. 595 (1878), there was no tie where twenty-two
members of council voted for one candidate and twenty-two for another and one blank
vote cast. See also State ex rel. Osborne v. City of McAllen, 56 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. 1932).
It seems that the principal case was correctly decided in applying what appears to
be the sounder rule, e.g., that the mayor is not counted in computing a majority of the
council where his vote is limited to the breaking of a tie. Where a different rule has
been applied it has generally led to needless complications and, in a few cases, absurdities, as in Seelig v. City of Ripon, 237 Wis. 533, 297 N.W. 368 (1941), where council
consisted of eight aldermen and the mayor, he being entitled to vote only in case of
a tie, but a majority of "all the members of the Council" was required to repeal an
ordinance. The council was divided four for and four against. It was held there was
no tie. The court said: "If an ordinance is adopted by a majority of all the members
of the council, there can never be a tie. It is a contradiction in terms to say that under
such a proposition a tie can ever exist. Consequently the mayor can never cast a vote
under such a'requirement."
GEORGE

TORTS-CARRIERS-DUTY

E.

SALIBA.

OWED TO INTOXICATED PASSENGER

Plaintiff sued defendant for personal injuries sustained as a passenger in defendant's
taxicab, alleging that the driver was negligent in accepting plaintiff's offer to repair
a flat tire while he was intoxicated and in failing to protect him from the traffic, as a
consequence of which a passing automobile struck him down. Defendant's general
demurrer was sustained, whereupon plaintiff appealed. Held: Reversed. Liability may
attach where a carrier accepts the services of an intoxicated passenger, who is unable
to protect himself, and places him in a position where the carrier should forsee that
he might suffer injury as a result of his exposure to danger. Swilley v. Economy Cab
Co., 46 So.2d 173 (Fla. 1950).
Taxicabs are generally treated as common carriers, which owe their passengers the
duty of exercising extraordinary care for their protection. Locke v. Ford, 54 Ga. App.
322, 187 S.E. 715 (1936) ; Korner v. Cosgrove, 108 Ohio St. 484, 141 N.E. 267, 31 A.L.R
1193 (1923). The fact that a passenger is intoxicated does not thereby relieve the
carrier of its duties to such passenger, Fagan v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co., 220 N.Y
301, 115 N.E. 704 (1917), but he is not entitled to any extra care. Louisville & N.R. Co
v. Mudd's Administratrx, 173 Ky. 330, 191 S.W. 102 (1917). A carrier is not bound tc
accept as a passenger one who is so intoxicated as to be incapable of caring for him.
self. Price v. St. Louis Ry. Co., 75 Ark. 479, 88 S.W. 575 (1905). But once a carriei
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accepts a passenger helplessly intoxicated, it is bound to exercise such care as is reasonably required for the passenger's safety. Fardette v. New York Ry. Co., 190 App.
Div. 543, 180 N.Y. Supp. 179 (1920) ; or as it is sometimes stated, the duty owed to
an intoxicated passenger is commensurate with his condition. Fagerdahl v. North Coast
TransportationCo., 178 Wash. 482, 35 P.2d 46 (1934). Some courts require the exercise
of a higher degree of care for an intoxicated passenger than for a sober passenger.
Bourgeois v. Toye Bros. Yellow Cab Co., 192 So. 379 (La. 1939) ; Fagan v. Atlantic
Coast Line Ry. Co., supra. Intoxication in and of itself cannot furnish the basis for an
inference of contributory negligence so as to bar recovery. Fardette v. New York Ry.
Co., supra.
As pointed out by the dissent a carrier is not an insurer of the absolute safety of
its passengers. Since voluntary intoxication will not relieve one from contributory negligence, a carrier may escape liability if it can show that the intoxication was the proximate cause of the injury. Wheeler v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 70 N.H. 607, 50 Atl. 103
(1901). Therefore, one who unnecessarily exposes himself to danger violates the rule
imposed on all men to use ordinary care for their own safety. Jurisdictions following
the view adopted by the dissent deny recovery to intoxicated passengers on the basis
of their own negligence rather than hold the carrier to a degree of care commensurate
with the condition of the individual passenger. Chevalier v. Chicago Transit Authority,
338 Ill. App. 119, 86 N.E.2d 838 (1949).
The result reached in the instant case would seem to be the correct one in view of
the particular circumstances. However negligent the conduct of the plaintiff is in cases
of this kind, his negligence should not be availed of by a carrier in mitigation of its
own required standard of duty. Though it might appear to be a harsh rule, it is vital
to the protection of the public.
FRANCIS

WILLS-HOLOGRAPHIC-STATUTORY

M.

DAVIS.

REQUIREMENT

AS TO

SIGNATURE
Administrator brought a bill for legatees under an after-discovered holographic will
seeking to impress a trust in favor of named legatees on property of deceased that had
been distributed on the assumption that she had died intestate. Lower court sustained
defendant's demurrer on the ground that testator's name at the beginning of the instrument was not a "signature" as required by statute. Held: Reversed. Code Section
5229 (now VA. CODE § 64-51 (1950)). Provides that the signing by the testator must be
in such a manner as to make it manifest that the name is intended as a signature. Here,
the will itself is sufficient to show that the name was manifestly intended as a signature.
Hall v. Brigstocke, 58 S.E.2d 529 (Va. 1950).
An holographic will to be valid must be in writing and signed by the testator. Hamlet
v. Hamlet, 183 Va. 453, 33 S.E.2d 729 (1945). This method of disposing of property
is generally regarded as a statutory right and, within constitutional limitations, is
subject to the control of the legislature. Black v. Maxwell, 46 S.E.2d 804 (W.Va. 1948).
Statutes on signatures to holographic wills have generally fallen into two classesone requiring the will to be signed or subscribed at the "end," and the other requiring
only that the will be "signed." In the former class some of the courts have so construed
the statutes as to require strict compliance to make the will valid. They hold that the
question is not one of the intention of the testator but one of what he did or did not
do. In re Churchill's Estate, 206 Pa. 94, 103 Atl. 533 (1918) ; Sears v. Sears, 77 Ohio
St. 104, 82 N.E. 1067, 17 L.R.A. (n.s.) 353, 11 Ann. Cas. 1008 (1907). Other courts
construing similar statutes have taken a more liberal view. They require only substantial compliance with the statute and state that the signature must be sufficiently
near the end of the instrument to indicate that the testator intended such signing as
his signature. Graham v. Edwards, 162 Ky. 771, 173 S.W. 127 (1915). As to the other
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class of statutes, they only require that the will be signed by the testator, and the
courts, in construing these statutes, have taken a very liberal view as to the position
of the signature on the instrument. The rule accepted by most of these courts is that
the document itself must show that the name of the testator was intended as a signature. This intent cannot be shown by extrinsic evidence but must be proved by an inspection of the whole instrument, including its language, completeess, form and the
relative position of its parts. If the signature is at the end, then the presumption
naturally arises that it was placed there as an execution if nothing to the contrary
appears. In re Manchester's Estate, 174 Cal. 417, 163 Pac. 358 (1917) ; McElroy v.
Rolston, 184 Va. 77, 34 S.E.2d 241 (1945) ; Paul v. Davenport, 217 N.C. 154, 7 S.E.2d
352 (1940).
The law of holographic wills has developed along one of two lines. First, there are
the strict statutes and the courts which require a strict compliance with these statutes.
Then, there are the liberal statues and the courts which liberally construe these and
the strict statutes. The advocates of the first view contend that by their method fraud
will be prevented and the probate of such instruments as notes, memorandums, unfinished papers, etc., will be denied. The followers of the liberal view justify their position on the ground that the testator's intent should be the controlling factor and this
intent should be given effect whenever possible. Though there is something to be said
for the first view, in that it furthers to doctrine of "certainty in the law," the second,
more liberal view, in giving full effect whenever possible to the testator's intent, seems
to reach a more just result.
JAMES T. STEWART.
WORKMENS

COMPENSATION-DETERMINING

SCOPE OF

EMPLOYMENT-DEVIATION
Deceased employee, project engineer for highway department, was subject to call at
any hour. He was killed in an automobile accident about 9:45 p.m. while apparently
performing official duties. Evidence was introduced at the trial which showed that on
the same night and prior to the accident, he had stopped to visit his ill father. Plaintiff,
widow of deceased, instituted suit under Workmens Compensation Act to recover compensation for the death of her husband. The trial court awarded compensation. Onl
appeal, Held: Affirmed. There was sufficient evidence to uphold jury's finding that
deceased was killed from injuries arising out of and in the course of employment.
Parrv. New Mexico State Highway Department, 54 N.M. 126, 215 P.2d 602 (1950).
In order for compensation to be due, injuries must arise both out of and in the
course of the employment; neither alone is enough. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. v.
Sprayberry, 69 Ga. App. 196, 25 S.E.2d 74 (1943). An injury to an employee arises out
of and in the course of his employment when such injury occurs at a place where he
may reasonably be and while he is fulfilling the duties of his employment or engaged
in doing something incidental thereto. Young v. Department of Labor and Industries,
200 Wash. 138, 93 P.2d 337., 123 ALR 1171 (1939). Thus when a person is found dead
in a place where he might reasonably be expected to be while performing his duties,
the natural presumption is that his death occurred out of and in the course of his employment. Standard Accident Insurance Co. v. Kiker, 45 Ga. App. 706, 165 S.E. 850
(1932). One test employed by some courts in determining the scope of employment in
regard to travel is that if the work of the employee creates the necessity for travel,
he is in the course of his employment though he is serving at the same time some purpose of his own. Marks' Dependents v. Gray, 251 N.Y. 90, 167 N.E. 181 (1929). An employee does not abandon his master's business merely because he serves some other
purpose at the same time. Clawson v. Pierce-Arrow Motor Co., 231 N.Y. 273, 131 N.E.
914 (1921). If service of the master is a concurrent cause of the trip the master is
liable for compensation if during such trip an injury is sustained. McKinney v. Dorlac,
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48 N.M. 149, 146 P.2d 867 (1944). Notwithstanding the fact that the mission may have
two objectives, service as intended by the contract of employment and also some personal objective of the employee, an injury sustained by the employee under such circumstances is an injury arising out of and in the course of employment. Travelers Insurance Co. v. Bailey, 76 Ga. App. 698, 47 S.E.2d 103 (1948). The court held in Van
Gee v. Korts, 252 N.Y. 241, 169 N.E. 370 (1929), that if the employee is required to
be in the particular conveyance at the time as an incident of the employment in furtherance of his master's business, and is injured, he comes within the act. Evidently the
courts have taken into consideration the individual's lust for wander and have accordingly held that it is not every slight deviation from the employee's duty that will deprive him or his dependents of their right to compensation. Stratton v. Interstate Fruit
Co., 47 S.D. "452, 199 N.W. 117 (1924) ; McKinney v. Dorlac, supra; Railway Express
Co. v. Lewis, 156 Va. 800, 159 S.E. 188 (1931); Wicker v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of
New York, 59 Ga. App. 521, 1 S.E.2d 464 (1939). A very recent Georgia case awarded
compensation where a traveling salesman was killed while attempting to jack up his
car even though he and his family were returning to their apartment after dining in
town that night. London Guarantee and Accident Co. v. Herndon, 81 Ga. App. 178, 58
S.E.2d 510 (1950). There is no requirement in the law that an employee at the time
of an injury must have no objective other than the business of the employer. Hartford
Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Walker, 75 Ga. App. 594, 44 S.E.2d 160 (1947). Merely
occupying oneself at the moment of injury in some-manner incidental to the employment
is sufficient. Kubera's Case, 320 Mass. 419, 69 N.E.2d 673 (1946).
In the minority of courts common law principles, long outworn, are brought back to
deny recovery in present day compensation actions. Fortunately in the field of Workmen's Compensation-the field that is close to the heart of the working man-the great
majority of courts have taken the cue from the legislative mandate-the command of
broad and liberal construction. 4 NACCA Law Journal 85, 88 (1949). In line with the
trend of liberal construction, the Court of Appeals of Georgia has said obiter that the
Worwmen's Compensation Act, being highly remedial in its nature, must be construed
liberally to effect its beneficient purpose. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. v. Sprayberry,
supra. The cases referred to tend to reiterate and to emphasize the idea that Workmen's
Compensation Acts should be construed liberally. The instant case is fully in accord
with this doctrine.
JOSEPH H. DAVIS.

